We analyze the role of common equity blockholders in fostering the formation of strategic alliances, establish a positive causal effect of strategic alliances on corporate innovation, and analyze the channels through which strategic alliances foster innovation. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, there is a positive relation between the fraction of a firms industry peers with whom it shares common blockholders and the number of strategic alliances that it enters into. Second, there is a positive relation between the R&D-related alliances formed by a firm and its subsequent innovation outcomes, as measured by the quantity and quality of patents filed, especially for alliances backed by common blockholders. Third, we document, for the first time in the literature, a unique method that firms use to share patent right with their alliance partners, namely, "co-patenting." Fourth, we establish a positive causal relation between the formation of strategic alliances and innovation: first, by comparing the innovation of firms that fail to form alliances to those of firms that are able to successfully form strategic alliances; and second, by using an instrumental variable approach. Fifth, we establish that an important channel through which strategic alliances foster greater innovation is through the more efficient redeployment of human capital (inventors) across alliance partners.
Introduction
It is well known that innovation is an important driver of the growth of firms and even the longrun economic growth of nations (Solow, 1957) . However, much of the existing literature that analyzes the determinants of corporate innovation has focused on organizational and financial factors that affect a firm in isolation rather than on its relationships with other firms in its industry. In this paper, we study a potentially equally important factor that may drive corporate innovation, namely, the contractual relationships that a firm may develop with other firms in its industry. In particular, we focus on the formation of strategic alliances by a firm and their effect on corporate innovation. We first analyze the determinants of the formation of strategic alliances and provide evidence that having common equity blockholders with other firms in its industry facilitates the formation of strategic alliances by a firm. We then establish a positive causal relation between the formation of a particular form of strategic alliance, namely, an R&D alliance, and an enhanced quality and quantity of corporate innovation. We also document the sharing of rights to innovations by alliance partners in the form of "co-patenting". Finally, we show that an important mechanism through which strategic alliances enhance innovation is by allowing better redeployment of human capital (movement of inventors) among the firms forming a strategic alliance.
There has been some debate in the academic as well as practitioner literature on the determinants of strategic alliance formation and the effect of such alliance formation on innovation.
On the one hand, the formation of strategic alliances may confer obvious benefits to the firms forming the alliance since each firm can receive some ingredients required for innovation from outside their firm boundaries, thus supplementing the resources available within the firm. On the other hand, lack of trust between the two firms involved may impede the formation of strategic alliances despite the above advantage from such alliance formation. In particular, some firms may be reluctant to form strategic alliances because of the fear that their alliance partners, often competitors, may steal valuable intellectual property or other information. In this context, third parties that have economic links to both the competing firms may play a crucial role in initiating strategic alliances between them by removing informational and organizational barriers. We argue that blockholders, with significant shareholdings in both firms, may help to build trust, align interests, and foster strategic alliances between two competing firms. We then show that the presence of common equity blockholdings by institutions across firms in an industry 1 promotes the formation of strategic alliances among these firms.
The above results on the effect of common blockholders on the propensity to form strategic alliances are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality. To demonstrate this, we exploit the annual Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions that bring exogenous shocks to the investor base of firms that switch index membership by a small margin. We find that firms that become more (less) connected with industry peers, after the annual index reconstitutions, form more (less) alliances than before. This evidence shows that our results are not driven by institutions accumulating blocks in the firms forming a strategic alliance because they anticipate the future formation of an alliance between these firms.
After analyzing the determinants of the formation of strategic alliances, we turn to our analysis of the effect of strategic alliances on corporate innovation. We focus on a specific type of alliance devoted to innovation, namely, an R&D alliance, in our empirical analysis.
Theoretical models offer conflicting views about how the strategic alliance activities of firms affect their innovation output. For instance, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) argue that R&D cooperation help to improve firm innovation outcome when spillovers are high enough. Robinson (2008) argues that strategic alliances help overcome incentive problems that arise when headquarters cannot pre-commit to a certain level of capital allocation. The above papers imply that R&D strategic alliances contribute positively to innovation through better aligned incentives and more efficient capital allocation. Lopez and Vives (2014) suggest that, when knowledge-spillovers are high enough, firms may free-ride on the innovation efforts of their rivals and lower their investment in innovation. Therefore, in the presence of such knowledge-spillovers, R&D cooperation allows firms to internalize externalities, thereby preserving their incentives to invest in R&D. This paper implies that R&D alliances contribute positively to innovation through limiting free riding among rivals. 1 In contrast to the above theories that predict a positive relation between R&D alliances and innovation outcomes, a large body of research on the theory of moral hazard in teams predicts that alliance formation will distort innovation incentives and affect innovation outcomes negatively. For instance, Bonatti and Horner (2011) 1 There are also many examples from the practitioner orientated literature consistent with the prediction that strategic alliances may have a positive effect on innovation. For example, Bill Gates, founder and former CEO of Microsoft, is quoted as saying: "The collaboration between Microsoft and Toshiba has consistently led to innovation (Toshiba) has also been our lead partner in developing Windows Vista for portable PCsI am sure our companies will continue to introduce break-through innovations for years to come." (2005 Annual Report of Toshiba Corporation) suggest that free-riding between collaborating partners leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. Further, Campbell, Ederer, and Spinnewijn (2014) argue that, in addition to free-riding, lack of communication in teams may also lead to delays.
Motivated by the above theoretical papers, we hypothesize that, while strategic alliance may enhance the quality and quality of innovation by alliance partners, their positive influence on corporate innovation may be driven primarily by alliances between firms that have common equity blockholdings. Blockholders in a firms' equity are likely to have produced detailed information about the strategy and the progress made by firms that they have invested in. At the same time, by virtue of their significant equity holdings in a firm, blockholders are also able to communicate directly with top firm management. Finally, these blockholders may also have the ability to influence the firm's corporate behavior, for example, they can threaten to exit the firm, i.e., to sell their blockholdings. The above implies that blockholders common to partnering firms in a strategic alliance have the ability to enhance communication and coordination among alliance partners as well to monitor the behavior of alliance partners. This, in turn, may mitigate the costs arising from strategic alliances while enhancing their benefits.
The results of our empirical analysis support the above hypothesis. In our baseline results, we find a strong positive relation between the number of R&D-related strategic alliances formed by a firm and the quantity (number of new patents obtained) and the quality (total citations or citations per patent) of innovation output by the firm after the formation of these alliances. We also find that firms that have more R&D alliances have higher research efficiency, as measured by either the number of new patents or the total citations for new patents scaled by R&D spending. In addition, we find that R&D alliances generate more favourable innovation output when the partnering firms are of higher quality (measured by their past innovation productivity).
Moreover, the positive effect of R&D alliances on innovation is primarily driven by alliances backed by common blockholders although the average effect of R&D alliances on innovation is positive. Finally, we document the sharing of rights to innovations by alliance partners in the form of co-patenting. Co-patenting patents refer to patents with multiple assignees and is direct evidence of research output arising from R&D collaboration between multiple firms. We find a strong positive relation between the number of R&D alliances formed by a firm and the number of new co-patenting patents that the firm obtains subsequent to the formation of these alliances.
While our baseline results are consistent with the hypothesis of a positive effect of strategic alliances on innovation, an important concern is that the formation of strategic alliances is potentially endogenous. For example, firms with higher innovation potential may attract more alliance partners. Moreover, unobservable firm characteristics may also affect both alliance formation and innovation outcomes. Therefore, to establish causality, we use three different identification strategies.
Our first identification strategy is to examine pre-existing trends in innovation (following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) ) making use of a matched sample. For each firm that form a successful alliance, we find a matching firm that does not form alliances using a propensity score matching approach. We analyze the change in corporate innovation for both groups of firms using a difference-in-difference approach. We find that firms that form alliances experience an increase in both the quantity and quality of innovation outcomes after alliance formation. Moreover, we find that R&D alliances have no impact on innovation one year before the announcement of the formation of the alliance. Most of the change in innovation occurs two or three years after the announcement of the alliance, indicating a causal effect of alliance on innovation.
Our second identification strategy relies on the fact that firms that announce a strategic alliance but fail to complete it would serve as a comparable counterfactual to firms that form alliances successfully. This approach is somewhat similar to the failed M&A approach adopted by Savor and Lu (2009) , though it differs from their analysis in that we conduct this test in the context of failed strategic alliances. We compare the innovation output of firms with announced but failed R&D alliance deals to the innovation output of firms with announced and successfully completed R&D alliance deals. We find that the firms with failed R&D alliance deals generate fewer patents and fewer total citations for their new patents obtained after the announcement.
It is unlikely that there is a systematic relation between the innovation potential of a firm and the probability that the firm's announced R&D alliances fail, so that this identification strategy helps us to establish a causal effect of a firms strategic alliances on its subsequent innovation outcomes.
Our third identification strategy is to conduct an instrumental variable (IV) analysis where our instrument is the fraction of industry peers within driving distance (250KM) from the firms headquarters. 2 The results of our IV analysis confirm the positive effect of R&D-related strategic alliances on innovation. Overall, our identification tests suggest that R&D-related strategic alliances have a positive causal effect on the innovation of alliance partners.
In the final part of our paper, we uncover one mechanism through which strategic alliances may help to increase the innovation output and innovation productivity of firms. In particular, we investigate the effect of strategic alliances on human capital redeployment between alliance partners. We provide three pieces of evidence in this regard. First, we find a strong positive relation between the number of R&D-related strategic alliances formed by a firm and the number of inventors, who have past work experience with one of the firms alliance partners (allianceconnected inventors), currently employed by this firm. Second, we find a positive relation between the number of R&D-related strategic alliances formed by a firm and the number of new patents (and the number of total citations for the new patents) contributed by alliance-connected inventors. Finally, we find that, the more of alliance-connected inventors employed by a firm involved in an R&D-related strategic alliance, the higher the quality and quality of innovation by the firm. Overall, we show that an important channel through which strategic alliances positively affect corporate innovation is by the redeployment of human capital (inventors) across alliance partners (as appropriate).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper is related to the existing literature and our contribution to this literature. Section 3 describes our sample selection procedures. Section 4 presents the determinants of strategic alliances with a focus on the relation between common equity blockholders and the formation of strategic alliances. Section 5 presents our baseline results on the effect of R&D related strategic alliances on corporate innovation. Section 6 presents three different empirical methodologies through which we establish causality between the formation of R&D-related strategic alliances and innovation. Section 7 shows that one mechanism through which R&D related strategic alliances enhance innovation is by facilitating the redeployment of human capital across alliance partners. Section 8 concludes.
Relation to the Existing Literature and Contribution
Our paper contributes to three different strands in the existing literature. First, our paper contributes to the debate about the role of financial institutions, particularly institutions that are large blockholders, in influencing corporate behavior. In particular, we focus on the role of institutional blockholders in facilitating the formation of strategic alliances that may possibly nurture corporate innovation. Edmans (2009) argues that blockholders benefit firms by exerting implicit governance power, through "voting with their feet," and discipline myopic managerial behavior (such as underinvestment in intangible assets). In Edmans framework, blockholders spur corporate innovation by reducing underinvestment in R&D. In contrast, Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013) argue that institutional shareholders increase innovation incentives through reducing career risk and find a positive relation between institutional ownership and corporate innovation. In addition to these channels through which institutional shareholders affect corporate innovation, we show that the presence of common equity blockholdings by institutions across firms in an industry promotes the formation of strategic alliances among these firms and thereby enhance in-house innovation with resources from outside firm boundaries.
The second literature our paper contributes to is the large literature on the effects of firm organization form and firm boundaries on firm growth and innovation. Seru (2014) argues that the conglomerate form negatively affects corporate innovation. Meanwhile, some papers in the existing literature show that firm boundaries shaped by strategic alliances have positive effects on firm growth. For instance, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) argue that R&D cooperation help to improve firm innovation outcome when spillovers are high enough. Chan et al. (1997) suggest that the formation of strategic alliances is associated with a positive stock market reaction and better long-run operating performance. They find that, for alliances within the same industry, more value accrues when the alliance involves the transfer or pooling of technical knowledge compared to cases of nontechnical alliances. The above paper implies that technical alliances, such as R&D alliances, create more value for the firms involved. Robinson (2008) pushes this argument further by introducing managerial effort into a model of internal capital markets. He argues that strategic alliances resolve contracting problems that surround resource allocations made in internal capital markets by facilitating the commitment to abandon winner-picking when it is ex ante inefficient. 3 However, the existing literature has documented that there are large variations in the effect of strategic alliances on firm growth. For example, Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) show that alliance agreements that are signed during periods of limited external equity financing are significantly less successful than other alliances. The empirical evidence in Lerner, Shane, and Tsai (2003) is consistent with the theoretical arguments that have been made about the costs arising from strategic alliances. For example, Bonatti and Horner (2011) argue that free-riding between collaborating partners leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. Campbell, Ederer, and Spinnewijn (2014) argue that, in addition to free-riding, lack of communication in teams may also lead to delays. Our paper studies how extending firm boundaries through the formation of R&D-related strategic alliances affects the outcomes of cooperative research endeavors between partnering firms. In addition, we explore the effect of R&D related strategic alliances backed by common blockholders, since the presence of common blockholders may help to limit the costs arising from alliance formation while enhancing the benefits from such alliances. Moreover, we establish a positive causal relation between the formation of strategic alliances and subsequent corporate innovation output using three different empirical methodologies, and document a potential mechanism through which strategic alliances enhance corporate innovation. 4 A contemporaneous paper that explores the formation and effects of strategic alliances is Li, Qiu, and Wang (2015) , who argue that competition spurs the formation of alliances, and that strategic alliances promote corporate innovation. Our paper differs from the above paper in several important ways, though the two papers can be viewed as providing some evidence complementary to each other. First, we show that the existence of common equity blockholders, after controlling for competition, fosters the formation of strategic alliances. Second, we adopt a different and arguably cleaner) identification strategy to establish a causal relation between R&D-related strategic alliances alliance and innovation outcomes. Further, we show that the positive effect of R&D related alliances on corporate innovation is primarily driven by alliances backed by common equity blockholders. Third, we document a unique manifestation of the outcome of R&D-related strategic alliance, namely, the co-patenting of patents between two alliance partners. Fourth, we establish that an important channel through which strategic alliances promote innovation is through more efficient human capital redeployment (inventors switching jobs between the two firms that formed an alliance before).
4 Our paper also contribute to the related literature that studies some other implications of strategic alliances. For example, Allen and Phillips (2000) document that strategic alliances create value for the target in an equity ownership transaction; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006) study whether alliances affect information flow between alliance partners; Mathews (2006) analyzes how alliances motivate interfirm equity sales between alliance partners; and Robinson and Stuart (2006) find that past alliance relationships serve as a governance mechanism in interfirm transactions.
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The third literature that our paper contributes to is the broader literature on the determinants of corporate innovation. The existing empirical evidence shows that various market-level and firm-specific factors affect managerial incentives to invest in innovation. Specifically, better access to bank credit (Cornaggia Mao, and Tian, 2013) , larger institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013) , less short-term pressures exerted by the financial markets (Tian and Wang, 2014; He and Tian, 2013) , more non-executive Employee Stock Options (Chang et al. 2015) , higher CEO overconfidence (Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh, 2012) , greater backing by corporate rather than independent venture capital firms (Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian, 2014) have all been shown to help to nurture greater corporate innovation. However, existing studies have largely ignored research inputs from outside the firm boundary: noteworthy exceptions are papers on acquiring innovation through M&A (Philips and Zhdanov, 2012; Bena and Li, 2014; Sevilir and Tian, 2012) , and learning from economically-linked customers (Chu, Tian, and Wang, 2014) . Our paper contributes to this latter line of research by offering direct evidence that R&D-related strategic alliances are an important channel for a firm to obtain important ingredients for innovation from outside the firm.
Data and Sample Selection
This section describes the data and our sample and provides summary statistics of the main variables.
Sample Selection
The sample includes US listed firms during the period from 1993 to 2003. We collect firm-year patent and citation information from the latest version of the National Bureau of Economic As patent innovations vary widely in their technological and economic importance, we use the total number of citations ultimately received by the patents applied for during the given year as our second measure. This measure takes into account both the number of patents and the number of citations per patent.
Patents created near the ending year of the sample have less time to accumulate citations because citations are received for many years after a patent is created. Following the existing innovation literature Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) , we adjust the citation measure to mitigate the truncation bias in citation counts. More specifically, we scale up the citation counts using the variable hjtwt provided by the NBER patent database that relies on the shape of the citation-lag distribution.
We also use four additional measures about innovation productivity for a firm: citation per patent (the average quality of patent), patent generality (the breadth of citation this patent receives), patent efficiency (total number of new patents apply per million of R&D expenses), citations efficiency (total number of new patents apply per million of R&D expenses).
In the final part of our empirical tests, we also measure the number and total citation of co-patenting patents (patents with multiple assignees). For each of the joint assignees, the ownership of the patent is equal to one divided by the total number of joint assignees for this patent. After we obtain the ownership of each firm in each co-patenting patent, we use the firm-level average as our dependent variables.
Measuring R&D Strategic Alliances and other Control Variables
We obtain strategic alliance information from SDC database. We count the number of R&D related alliances formed by a firm in past five years. 5 We retain the strategic alliances that involve at least one US listed firm. We then take natural logarithm of the (one plus) this raw measure to construct our main explanatory variable (Log(1+#RDA)). We focus on researchdevelopment related alliances in our main tests (Other alliances types include but do not restrict to: marketing alliance, manufacturing alliance, licencing alliance, etc.)
Following the innovation literature, we control for firm characteristics that could affect a firms future innovation output. We compute all variables for firm i over its fiscal year t (one year prior to the period when dependent variable is measured). The control variables include firm size (the nature logarithm of book assets), firm age(the number of years since the initial public offering (IPO) date), investments in intangible assets (R&D expenditures over total assets), profitability (return on assets (ROA)), tangible asset (net properties, plants, and equipment (PPE) scaled by total assets), leverage, capital expenditures, growth opportunities (Tobin's Q), financial constraints (the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) five-variable KZindex), industry concentration (the Herfindahl index based on sales), Institutional ownership, and stock illiquidity (the natural logarithm of relative effective spreads), and market share (sales of a firm scale by sum of sales for firms in the same industry). Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables based on the sample for our baseline analysis. Our main dependent (explanatory) variables are taken from a sample period from 1994 through 2004 (1993-2003) . Due to the right-skewed distributions of patents counts and citations, we follow the literature to measure the dependent variables as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents or citations counts (We add one to the actual values when calculating the natural logarithm in order to avoid losing firm-year observations with zero patents or citations).
Summary Statistics
On average, a firm in our final sample has a log total number of 0.703 patents and 1.372 total citations per year, among which an average of 0.037 patents are filed as co-patents (according to our characterization) generating 0.104 citations from co-patents per year. For each firm year, we also identify the inventors (from HBS inventor database) that apply patent for this company.
An inventor is treated as SA related inventor if he/she has worked before in at least one of the firms R&D strategic alliance (SA) partner. On average, we identify 0.042 SA related inventors who contribute 0.053 patents and 0.091 citations per year. In addition to patent and citation count measures, we also track the average number of citations per patent, patent generality (measured as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all patents that cite a firms given patent, averaged across all patents generated by the firm in a given year) as well as patent and citation efficiency (equal to the log of one plus the number of total patents (citations) in year t+1 divided by R&D expense spent in year t).
An average firm in our sample has a log total number of 0.141 R&D strategic alliances established in from year t-4 to t. Following the innovation literature, we control for a vector of firm and industry characteristics that may have an impact on firms future innovation productivity.
These variables include size, R&D expenditure, capital expenditure, ROA, firm age, tangibility, leverage, Tobins Q, stock illiquidity, institutional ownership and Kzindex. In our sample, an average firm has total assets of $5.123 billion, ROA of 3.3%, PPE ratio of 24.4%, leverage of 15.1%, Tobins Q of 2.3, and has a log firm age of 2.174 years since its IPO date. To assess whether existing of common blockholders increase corporate alliance, we first identify blockholders in each firm as institutions that hold at least five percent of shares outstanding:
Then we determine whether two firms are cross-held by the same blockholder. If at least one institution hold a block in both firms, then we refer the two firms are connected. The variable we are interested is % of Connected Peers -fraction of industry peers that are connected to this firm by a common blockholder. The premise is that most alliances are formed between firms in the same industry. Dependent variables measure number of different types of strategic alliances (in log) in year t+1. In this test, we use information about research & development related alliance and other forms of alliance. For example, #SAJV refers to total number of strategic alliances or joint ventures formed in year t+1, #RDA refers to total number of research and development related alliances formed in year t+1, #LIC refers to total number of licencing related alliances formed in year t+1, #MKT refers to total number of marketing related alliances formed in year t+1, #MNF refers to total number of manufacturing related alliances formed in year t+1. All control variables are measured in year t. In Table 2 panel A, we find evidence of a significant relation between fractions of industry peers that is connected to a firm (via common blockholders) and number of alliances the firm formed in the subsequent year. The effect shows up when we look at the aggregate number of all forms of alliances. When we do a breakdown based on types of alliances, we find it holds for alliances that involve exchange of technological information or sensitive marketing information (i.e., R&D alliance, licencing alliance and marketing alliance).
We use SIC two digits as industry classification, but we repeat our test using SIC one digit or three digits and observe similar results, please refer to the table in the appendix.
In Table 2 panel A, we find evidence of a significant relation between fractions of industry peers that is connected to a firm (via common blockholders) and number of alliances the firm formed in the subsequent year. The effect shows up when we look at the aggregate number of all forms of alliances. When we do a breakdown based on types of alliances, we find it holds for alliances that involve exchange of technological information or sensitive marketing information (i.e., R&D alliance, licencing alliance and marketing alliance).We use SIC two digits as industry classification, but we repeat our test using SIC one digit or three digits and observe similar results, please refer to the table in the appendix.
Connections with Industry Peers through Common Blockholders of Different Types
We further extend our analysis to differentiate effects of three types of institutions in connecting the firm and its industry peers: quasi-indexer, transient investors and dedicated investors. We follow the institution classification proposed by Bushee and Noe (2000) . Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) argue that quasi-indexers are passive investor, not passive owners, and provide evidence that quasi-indexers play a key role in influencing firms' corporate governance choices.
Similarly, quasi-indexers are also influencing other corporate policies like payouts, investment, the composition of CEO pay, management disclosure, and acquisitions (Boone and White, 2014; Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2014; Lu, 2014) .
Consistent with the active role of quasi-indexers in existing literature, in Table 2 panel B, we find that quasi-indexers play an important role in facilitating R&D related alliances through their cross-holding in firms in the same industry. This evidence supplements recent discussions regarding the influence of these passive investors on corporate policy. We also find evidence that equity cross-holding by transient investors contributes to formation of alliances. It suggests that investors with relative shorter investment horizon have incentives to speed up the technology development through co-operation between firms. However, due to the nature of short horizon of these investors and positive alliance announcement return in general (e.g., Chan, 1997), transient investors are also likely to help to form alliances and exit after capturing the shortterm gain once the alliance is formed. In contrast, we find that dedicated investors do not help the formation of R&D alliance. The presence of dedicated investors, with longer investment horizon and presumably higher tolerance for R&D failures, allows the firm to take more risk by carrying on its R&D alone, rather than sharing the outcome of R&D with other research partners. Therefore, firms cross-held by dedicated investors have less incentive to maintain a high level of alliances.
Connections with Industry Peers: Difference-in-Difference Analysis using Russell 1000/2000 Index Reconstitution
The positive relation between having common blockholders and formation of alliances could reflect either the active role of institutional blockholder in shaping corporate policy or the anticipation effect by these institutional investors. The anticipation effect hypothesis suggests that investors anticipate the formation of alliances in the future therefore accumulate a block in the two firms before they form an alliance. To differentiate the two possible explanations, we use an exogenous shock to the investor base caused by annual Russell index reconstitution. In
May of each year, Russell Company assigns the largest 1000 companies, based on firm market capitalization in the end of May, into the Russell 1000 index and the next 2000 companies into the Russell 2000 index. For firms that just pass the index reconstitution threshold and move from one index to the other index, the change of the investor base is primarily due to non-fundamental reason. The event of index reconstitution reflects an exogenous shock to the investor holdings in the switchers, and therefore a shock to the presence of common blockholders 13 in these stocks.
In our paper, we identify firms that switch index membership during the two consecutive years but just cross the index reconstitution threshold. In particular, we retain firms that belong to Russell 1000 (2000) index in year t-1, but switch to Russell 2000 (1000) index in year t. In addition, we require that the firms' ranks in year t, after the switching, fall in the range from 1001st to 1200th for Russell 2000 (801st to 1000th for Russell 1000 index). In other words, we restrict the distance of retained index switchers to the reconstitution threshold be less than 200 following existing literature that also explore the same event, such as Boone and White (2015).
For each of those index switchers in year t, we calculate the fraction of industry peers it connects via common blockholders as of June in year t-1 and June in year t, separately. We calculate the change in the fraction of industry peers it connects from year t-1 to t. Within each year, we sort firms into tertile groups based on the change of the fraction of industry peers it connects. Firms in the top (bottom) tertile group experience the largest increase (decrease) in the industry peers that they are connected with. We use firms in the top tertile group as treatment group and, as a comparison, use firms in the bottom tertile group as control group.
We measure the number of R&D alliances and all types of alliances formed by the firm in the twelve months starting from July in year t (immediately after the index reconstitution).
As a comparison, we report the number of alliances formed in the twelve months immediately before the index reconstitution. We report the difference in the number of alliances formed (after minus before). Table 3 presents the results using difference-in-difference analysis. Firms in the treatment group form more alliances after the index reconstitution, while firms in the control group form fewer alliances in the after period. The results hold for R&D alliances as well as the aggregated number of all alliances formed. The results support the active role of blockholder in promoting formation of alliances.
Overall, we find that firms that become more (less) connected with industry peers, after the annual index reconstitutions, form more (less) alliances than before. This evidence shows that our results are not driven by institutions accumulating blocks in the firms forming a strategic alliance because they anticipate the future formation of an alliance between these firms. 14 5 Effect of R&D Alliances on Innovation: Baseline Empirical Results
Effect of R&D Alliances on Quantity and Quality of Innovation Output
To assess whether R&D alliance enhances or impedes corporate innovation, we first estimate the following model:
Our main explanatory variable is R&D alliance (Log(1+#RDA)) measured as the logarithm of one plus the total number of R&D alliance that a firm established in the past five years [t-4, t] . We are interested in its effect on the firms innovation outcome, Log (1+#Pat) and Log (1+#Cite) in year t+1. Table 4 reports our baseline results for the effect of R&D alliance on innovation. We include a large set of control variables that are found to be predictors of innovation output. We also control for unobserved firm and year effects on innovation with fixed effects specification. The coefficient estimate of Log(1+#RDA) is positive and economically and statistically significant. A one unit increase in the log number of R&D alliances formed the past five years (1+#RDA) is associated with an 11.4% increase in the log number of patents filed in year t+1 and a 37.3% increase in the log total citations of patents filed in year t+1.
After observing a strong positive relation between R&D alliance of a firm and the number of new patents (citations) the firm obtains after alliance formation, we conduct similar analysis for alternative innovations outcome variables. Specifically, we replace the previous outcome variable in the baseline regression model with two types of variables measuring innovation quality (Cite/patent and Generality) and research efficiency (Patent/RD and Citation/RD). Table 5 reports the regression output with alternative corporate innovation outcome variables. The coefficient estimate of Log(1+ #RDA) is positive and economically and statistically significant in all specifications. A one unit increase in the log number of R&D alliances formed in the past five years is associated with a 22.4% increase in the number of citations per patents, a 1.7% increase in patent generality, and a 3.5% (21.5%) increase in patent (citation) efficiency associated with the patents filed in year t+1.
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Effect of R&D Alliances on Innovation: Quality of Alliance Partners
The analysis in the previous sections provide evidence that strategic alliances foster innovation with an emphasis on the number of alliances formed which measures the extensive margin of strategic cooperation between firms. Alternatively, we could argue that whatever effect of strategic alliance on a firm should ultimately be coming from its alliance partners. In fact, strategic partnership may well be viewed as a form of interaction between peer firms. We thus conjecture a positive spill-over effect from alliance partners: if the firm's alliance partners have performed well in innovation (i.e. being productive in generating new patents), we should expect to see an improvement in the firms innovation output as a response. To further shed light on this, we adopt a measure to capture how the firms strategic partners have performed in the innovation. We use the total number of patents filed by firm i's partner firms who formed R&D alliances with firm i from year t-2 to year t as a measure of peer firms' innovation output. patents filed in the past three years is associated with a 14.4% (2.4%) increase in the number of patents (co-patents) filed by the own firm, and a 22.2% increase in the number of citations per patents.
Event Study Finding: Innovation Output after Alliances Backed by Common Blockholders
We conduct an event study around formation of each R&D alliance. We separate R&D alliances by whether they are backed by common blockholders, i.e., whether there is at least one blockholder common to the two partnering firms. We then conduct difference-in-difference analysis comparing firms involving in these two types of R&D alliances. For each firm that form an R&D alliance in year t, we keep the firm-year observation in seven years centreing on the formation year, i.e., from year t-3 to t+3. We run following OLS regression with firm and year fixed effect 16 to estimate the innovation output of firms surrounding formation of two types of R&D alliances:
LOGP AT ( or LOGCIT E) = β 0 + β 1 Dummy(Common Blockholder Backed) × P OST +β 2 P OST + β 3 Dummy(Common Blockholder Backed)
where POST is a dummy variable that equals to one if the observation is in the years t+1 to t+3 (i.e., after the formation of alliance), and equals to zero otherwise. Dummy(Common blockholder Backed) is a dummy variable that equals to one if there is at least one common blockholder that holds blocks (5% of shares outstanding) in both alliance partners, otherwise equals to zero. The dependent variable is either LOGPAT, firm is log number of patents in a given year, or LOGCITE, firm i's log total citations for patents filed in a given year. We find positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates of β 1 , which suggests that firms forming common blockholder-backed R&D alliances experience increase in the innovation output (larger number of patents and more citations) qua after the R&D alliance formation. We also confirm our previous finding in baseline results (in section 5.1) that the average effect of R&D alliance formation on corporate innovation is positive, because the sum of the coefficient of the interaction term and POST dummy is positive (i.e., β 1 + β 2 > 0).
Effect of R&D Alliances on Innovation: Sharing Rights to Innovations by Co-patenting
In this section, we document the sharing of rights to innovation by alliance partners in the form of co-patenting. Co-patenting patents refer to patents with multiple assignees and is direct evidence of research output arising from R&D collaboration between multiple firms. We measure the quantity and quality of co-patenting patents and analyze how they are affected by past R&D alliance activities. In our multivariate test, #Co-Pat and #Co-Cite refers to total number of co-patents filed in year t+1, total citation for co-patents filed in t+1. We use logged variable as our dependent variables: Log (1+#Co-Pat) and Log (1+#Co-Cite). #RDA refers to number of R&D alliance each firm established in the past five years [t-4, t] . We use Log(1+#RDA) as main explanatory variable. Other control variables are measured in year t. Table 8 we report the inter-firm co-patenting of patents between strategic alliance partners. For regressions of both Log (1+#Co-Pat) and Log (1+#Co-Cite), the coefficient estimate of Log(1+#RDA) is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with more RD alliance have a larger number of co-patented patents.
Effect of R&D Alliances on Innovation: Identification
While the baseline results show a strong positive relation between the number of R&D alliances of a firm and the number of new patents (citations) the firm generates after alliance formation, we cannot determine whether this effect is causal. The main concern is that the formation of strategic alliance is likely to be endogenous. Firms with greater innovation potential may attract more alliances (i.e. reverse causality). Moreover, unobservable firm characteristics may affect both alliance formation and innovation outcome (i.e. omitted variable concern). To establish causality, in this section we present our main results using three types of identification strategies.
Effect of R&D Alliance on Innovation: Difference-in-Differences Analysis comparing Firms with Successful Alliances to Firms with No Alliances
One alternative identification strategy is to examine pre-existing trends in innovation following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) . Our baseline results may be subject to reverse causality if firms that notice an increase in the number of patents respond by forming alliances. If this were the case, there would be a trend of increasing innovation even before the alliances are announced. We adopt a DiD approach to compare the innovation output of a sample of treatment firms who formed completed R&D alliance to that of control firms who have no R&D alliance. Our treatment group consists of firms that have a completed R&D alliance in 1992 2002. For each treatment firm, we find a control firm in the same year using propensity score matching based on two requirements: first it does not have a completed R&D alliance in the same year as the treatment firm, and second it has the same likelihood (if not the same, the closest with less than 10% deviation) based on the first stage models prediction of the existence of successful alliance. Table 9 panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores for the treatment and control group. The dependent variable is one if the firm-year belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. The results
in column (1) shows that the specification captures a significant amount of variation in the dependent variable, as indicated by a pseudo-R 2 of 34.8% and a p-value from the Chi-square test of the overall model fitness well below 0.001. We then use the predicted probabilities from column (1) and perform a nearest-neighbour propensity score matching procedure. We end up with 1,079 unique pairs of matched firms. We apply diagnostic tests to verify that the parallel trends assumption is met. As is shown in column (2) of Table 9 panel A, none of the explanatory variables is statistically significant. In particular, the coefficient estimates of the preshock innovation growth are not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no observable difference in the innovation outcomes between the two groups of firms pre-treatment event.
We report the univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms characteristics and their corresponding t-statistics is shown in panel B. As it turns out, none of the observed differences between the treatment and control firms characteristics is statistically significant.
These diagnostic tests suggest that the propensity score matching method has controlled for meaningful observable differences between the treatment and control group. Table 9 panel C reports the DiD estimators. LOGPAT is the sum of firm is number of patents in the three-year window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). CITE is the sum of firm i's total citations for patents filed in the three-year window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). We compute the average change in LOGPAT and CITE for the treatment and control group and report the DiD estimators and the corresponding two-tailed t-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the DiD estimators are equal to zero. We find that both the treatment group (successful alliance) and control group (no alliance) experience a significant increase in the number of patents and that the increase is larger for the treatment group than for the control group as the DiD estimator of LOGPAT is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The number of citations of the treatment (control) group goes up (down) significantly after the alliance formation. As a result, the DiD estimator of LOGCITE is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Table 9 panel D we show our DiD results in a regression framework to estimate the innovation dynamics of treatment and control firms surrounding R&D alliance formation. We estimate the following model:
The dependent variable is either LOGP AT * , firm is log number of patents in a given year, or LOGCIT E * , firm i's log total citations for patents filed in a given year. TREAT is a dummy that equals one for treatment firms and zero for control firms. BEF ORE 1 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from the year before R&D alliance (year -1) and zero otherwise.
CURRENT is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from the R&D alliance year (year 0) and zero otherwise. AF T ER 1 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from the year immediately after R&D alliance (year 1) and zero otherwise. AFTER2&3 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from two or three years after R&D alliance (year 2 and 3) and zero otherwise. Regression results of LOGPAT (LOGCITE) are reported in column 1 and 2 (3 and 4). In both column 2 and 4, we observe statistically insignificant coefficient estimates of d, suggesting that the parallel trend assumption of the DiD approach is not violated. We find positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates of β 1 and β 2 , which suggests that compared to control firms, the treatment firms generate a larger number of patents and citations in the years following R&D alliance formation.
In sum, this analysis shows that strategic alliances have no impact on innovation one year before the announcement and that the change in innovation occurs mostly two or three years after the announcement of the alliance, indicating a causal effect of alliance on innovation.
Effect of R&D Alliance on Innovation: Difference-in-Differences Analysis using Failed Attempts to Form Alliance
Our first identification strategy is built on the intuition that firms that announce a strategic alliance deal but fail to complete it would serve a comparable counterfactual to firms that form alliances successfully. We adopt a difference-in-differences (hereafter, DiD) approach to examine the effect of an R&D alliance on firm innovation by comparing the innovation output of firms 20 with announced but failed R&D alliance deals to the innovation output of firms with announced and successfully completed R&D alliance deals. To identify firms with failed alliances, we first obtain R&D alliance with type "Pending" or "Intent" from SDC. Then we manually search via Google, Factiva, company website, 10K, 8K, and 10Q filings through SEC EDGAR about the outcome for each of these deals. Most of these deals eventually complete, we retain "Pending"
or "Intent" deals that are withdrawn. These failed alliance attempts serve as counterfactual group for successful alliance deals. We try to find out the reason of withdrawing the alliance deal and exclude deals withdrawn due to reasons about innovation ability. However, there is not enough disclosure regarding the reason to withdraw alliance. To mitigate the concern that these failed alliance deals are driven by deteriorating innovation ability of either alliance partner, we conduct a propensity score matching to control for observable differences in innovation ability and other firm characteristics.
In Table 10 , we report results of the DiD analysis using failed alliance versus successful alliance. Treatment group in this test consists of firms that have at least one failed R&D alliance (We require the Treatment firms do not have any other successful alliance in the same year).
For each treatment firm, we find five control firms in the same year and in the same industry (SIC one digit) using propensity score matching. The controlling firm meets two requirements:
first it has at least one completed R&D alliance in the same year as the treatment firm and is from the same industry, and second it has the same likelihood (if not the same, the closest with less than 1% deviation) based on the first stage models prediction of the existence of successful alliance. Panel A describe the procedure to collect the information about failed alliance starting from the R&D alliance announcement in SDC database. Fail alliance refers to the alliances that a firm intent to initiate or in the stage of pending, but eventually fail to arrive at a final deal.
We were able to find 24 failed alliances and match them to 61 successful alliances.
In Table 10 panel B, we confirm that there is no significant difference between the observable characteristics of treatment and control firms on most dimensions. Panel C presents the DiD test results. As shown, the DiD estimators for both LOGPAT and LOGCITE are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that the firms experience a decrease in the number of patents and citations following failed alliance as compared to successful alliance. This result is consistent with the positive effect of completed R&D alliance on innovation shown in Table 9 .
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To the extent that there is no systematic relation between the innovation potential of a firm and the probability that the firm's announced R&D alliances fail, this identification strategy helps establish a causal effect of a firm's alliance actively on its subsequent innovation outcome. (1+#RDA) is positive and significant at the 5% level for both the number of patents and citations. Thus, the 2SLS results confirm the positive effect of R&D alliance on innovation.
Overall, our identification tests reported in this section suggest that there is a positive causal effect of R&D alliance on firm innovation.
An Underlying Mechanisms of R&D Alliances
We show that an important mechanism through which strategic alliances enhances innovation is by allowing the redeployment of human capital (movement of inventors) among alliance partners. Table 12 presents a detailed analysis using information about inventors-identifying the movement of inventors between alliance partners. For each firm in each year, we identify the inventors (from HBS inventor database) that apply patent for this company. An inventor is treated as SA related inventor if he/she has worked before in at least one of the firm's R&D strategic alliance (SA) partners. We count the total number of SA related inventors in each year (SA INVT), total number of patents contributed by these SA related inventors (SA PAT), and total number of citations received by patents contributed by these SA related inventors (SA CITE). We find that firms with more RD alliance have more inventors working for their past alliance patterns, have more patents (citations of patents) contributed by these alliance related inventors. Table 13 shows that more human capital redeployment (movement of inventors) among alliance partners enhances corporate innovation after controlling for the number of alliances formed in the past.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study how common blockholders foster formation of alliances and how research collaboration affects corporate innovation. We show that institutional blockholders can be beneficial to firms by facilitating alliances between firms where they hold significant shares.
In addition, we find a positive relation between R&D strategic alliances of a firm and its subsequent innovation outcome measured by the quantity and quality of patents the firm obtains.
To identify causality between alliances and innovation, we compare the innovation output of 23 firms with failed alliances to that of firms with successful alliances. We find that firms experience decreases in both quantity and quality of the patents the firm obtains after their failed alliance. Most of the positive impact of successful R&D alliances on innovation occurs two or more years after they are announced, indicating a causal effect of alliance on innovation, that is also supported with an instrumental variable approach.
Furthermore, we uncover direct effects of strategic alliances: increases in number of allianceconnected inventors, innovation output ascribing to these inventors, and co-patenting of patents between alliance partners. The evidence illustrates the underlying mechanisms through which research cooperation improve knowledge spill over and ensuring better innovation output between alliance partners. We also find that a firm could benefit more from spill over effect if its alliance peers are experiencing favourable technological progress.
Overall, our paper offers novel evidence that research collaboration plays an important role in nurturing innovation and emphasizes the positive role of blockholders in improving corporate research collaboration and output. and (1+#Co-Cite) refers to log total number of patents filed in year t+1, log total number of co-patents filed in year t+1, total citations for patents filed in t+1, total citation for co-patents filed in t+1, log total number of co-patents filed in year t+1, log total citation for co-patents filed in t+1. For each firm in each year, we identify the inventors (from HBS inventor database) that apply patent for this company. An inventor is treated as SA related inventor if he/she has worked before in at least one of the firm's R&D strategic alliance (SA) partner. Log (1+# of SA INVT) is log total # of SA related inventors in each year, Log (1+# of SA_PAT) is log total # of patents contributed by these SA related inventors, Log (1+# of SA_CITE) is log total # of citations received by patents contributed by these SA related inventors. Cite/patent is the log (1+average number of citations per patent for patents filed in year t+1). Generality is one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the patents that cite a firm's given patent. We then take the average for all patents generated by the firm in year t+1. This table presents difference-in-difference analysis using Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions as exogenous shocks to firms' connections with industry peers through common equity blockholders. Annual Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions bring exogenous investor turnover around the reconstitutions. We identify firms that just switch index membership (move up to Russell 1000 index or move down to Russell 2000 index), and calculate the resulting changes of their connections with industry peers due to the exogenous investor turnover. We rank these firms by their changes of connected industry peers into tertile groups each year and analyze consequent formation of strategic alliances. Connected industry peers refer to firms that share the same block equity shareholder (with at least 5% shares outstanding in each firm). Treatment (Control) group includes firms that rank in the top (bottom) tertile groups that experience the largest increase (decrease) of connections with industry peers after the index reconstitutions. We report the number of alliances formed in the year immediately after the Russell index reconstitutions, and compare it with number of alliances formed in one year before the reconstitutions. We report the difference-indifference results in the last column. We report the number of R&D related alliances and the number of all types of alliances. T-statistics are in bracket. This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics obtained from OLS estimation of the corporate innovation outcomes using alternative innovation measures. Citation/Patent is the log (1+average number of citations per patent for patents filed in year t+1). Generality is one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the patents that cite a firm's given patent. We then take the average for all patents generated by the firm in year t+1. Patent/RD and Citation/RD measure the efficiency of research activity, they equal to log (1+#Total Patent/RD expenses) and log (1+# Total Citations/RD expenses) for all patents filed in year t+1 to year t+3 by each firm, respectively. RD refers to R&D expenses spent in year t. These two variables are constructed in the same spirit as Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013). We take log of the original ratio (#Total Patent/RD and # Total Citations/RD) in light of their high skewness. #RDA refers to number of R&D alliance each firm established in the past five years [t-4, t] . We use Log(1+ #RDA) as main explanatory variable. Other control variables are measured in year t. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents the difference-in-difference analysis comparing firms forming R&D alliances that are backed by common blockholders to firms forming non common blockholder-backed R&D alliances. For each firm that forms an R&D alliance in year t, we keep firm-year observations in the seven years around the formation year, i.e., from year t-3 to t+3. POST is a dummy variable that equals to one if the observation is in the years t+1 to t+3 (i.e., after the formation of alliance), and equals to zero otherwise. Dummy(Common blockholders Backed) is a dummy variable that equals to one if there is a common blockholder that holds a block (5% of shares outstanding) in both alliance partners, otherwise equals to zero. We run an OLS regression with firm and year fixed effect. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. For each treatment firm, we find a control firm in the same year using propensity score matching. The controlling firm meets two requirements: first it does not have a completed R&D alliance in the same year as the treatment firm, and second it has the same likelihood (if not the same, the closest with less than 10% deviation) based on the first stage model's prediction of the existence of successful alliance. Panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores for the treatment and control groups. The dependent variable is one if the firm-year belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. The "Pre-Match" column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the sample prior to matching. These estimates are then used to generate the propensity scores for matching. The "Post-Match" column contains the parameter estimates of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched treatment-control pairs after matching. Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects are included in both columns of Panel A but the coefficients are not reported. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their robust t-statistics clustered at firm levels are displayed in parentheses below. Panel B reports the univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms' characteristics and their corresponding t-statistics. Panel C gives the DiD test results. LOGPAT is the sum of firm i's number of patents in the threeyear window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). CITE is the sum of firm i's total citations for patents filed in the three-year window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). Panel D reports the regression results that estimate the innovation dynamics of treatment and control firms surrounding R&D alliance formation. We estimate the following model: LOGPAT(LOGCIT) = 0 + 1 TREAT * AFTER 2&3 + 2 TREAT * AFTER 1 + 3 TREAT * CONCURRENT + 4 TREAT * BEFORE 1 + 5 AFTER 2&3 + 6 AFTER 1 + 7 CONCURRENT + 8 BEFORE 1 + FIRM FE + , (3) The dependent variable is either LOGPAT, firm i's log number of patents in a given year, or LOGCITE, firm i's log total citations for patents filed in a given year. TREAT is a dummy that equals one for treatment firms and zero for control firms. BEFORE 1 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from the year before R&D alliance (year -1) and zero otherwise. CURRENT is a dummy that equals one if a firmyear observation is from the R&D alliance year (year 0) and zero otherwise. AFTER 1 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from the year immediately after R&D alliance (year 1) and zero otherwise. AFTER 2&3 is a dummy that equals one if a firm-year observation is from two or three years after R&D alliance (year 2 and 3) and zero otherwise. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and robust t-statistics are displayed in parentheses below. This table reports the innovation outcome of firms that fail to form R&D alliances using difference-indifference analysis. Treatment group consists of firms that have at least one failed attempt to form R&D alliance (We require the treatment firms do not have any other successful alliance in the same year). For each treatment firm, we find five control firms in the same year and in the same industry (SIC one digit) using propensity score matching. The controlling firm meets two requirements: first it has at least one completed R&D alliance in the same year as the treatment firm and is from the same industry, and second it has the same likelihood (if not the same, the closest with less than 1% deviation) based on the first stage model's prediction of the existence of successful alliance. Panel A describe the procedure to collect the information about failed alliance starting from the R&D alliance announcements in SDC database. Failed alliances refer to the alliances that a firm intends to initiate or in the stage of pending, but eventually fail to arrive at a final deal. Panel B reports the univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms' characteristics and their corresponding t-statistics. Panel C gives the DiD test results. LOGPAT is the sum of firm i's number of patents in the three-year window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). CITE is the sum of firm i's total citations for patents filed in the three-year window before or after R&D alliance formation (we take log of the raw number plus one). This table reports the coefficients and t-statistics obtained from OLS estimation of the human capital redeployment. For each firm in each year, we identify the inventors (from HBS inventor database) that apply patent for this company. An inventor is treated as SA related inventor if he/she had worked before in at least one of the firm's R&D strategic alliance (SA) partners before he/she joined current company. We count the total # of SA related inventors in each year (SA_INVT), total # of patents contributed by these SA related inventors (SA_PAT), and total # of citations received by patents contributed by these SA related inventors (SA_CITE). We use log of one plus original value measured in year t+1 as dependent variable. #RDA measures the total # of R&D alliance one firm forms in the past five years. Other control variables are measured in year t. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents robustness results of formation of R&D alliances using various industry classifications (SIC 1 digit, 2 digits, or 3 digits) to define peers. We calculate the fraction of connected peers using these alternative industry measures. % of Connected Peers is the fraction of industry peers that are connected to this firm by a common block shareholder (i.e., if there is at least one shareholder who holds a block larger than 5% of shares outstanding in both firms, then the two firms are said connected). All control variables are measured in year t. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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